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A Derivation of Equation (7) We shall derive equation equation (7). The no-arbitrage condition in equation equation (6) can be written as q π M v = ρ + qg. In this formulation, we make use of the fact thatv v = −g and r = ρ. Using the expressions of profit, π M = 1−α α wx M ,and value of a firm, v = a n M +λn C , in equation (6), we obtain:
Next, we replace n C in terms of n M as n C = 1−n M , we have:
Rearranging the terms of this equation, we obtain equation (7).
B Proof of Proposition 1
We differentiate equation (9) with respect to q to get
Clearly dD dq > 0 since α −ε > 1. We, now, find out the condition for which dN dq ≤ 0 and N > 0. Differentiating the expression of N with respect to q, we get
We assume that λ is sufficiently large so that 
In inequality (A-2), the right hand side has to be less than unity as q can not be greater than unity. This puts a restriction on q * , namely q * < 1, i.e.,
Finally, it is easy to verify that (
(A-4) (A-4) is a sufficient condition for positivity of N at q = q * . (A-4) and (A-1), when satisfied jointly, yields dN dq < 0 for q ∈ (q * , 1). Since N attains its maximum at q = q * and N is positive at q = 1, we must have N > 0 for all values of q ∈ [q * , 1]. This ensures that g > 0 for q ∈ [q * , 1].
C Inverted 'U' Shape
The expression for 
dq 2 < 0 requires the assumption that λ > α −ε . We assume that this is always fulfilled. Also we are only focusing on the values of g such that g > 0. Then N must be positive which requires that q must not be too close to zero. This guarantees an inverse 'U' shape relationship between g and q when g > 0. Thus, g must attain the maximum at q =q and this maximum value must be positive. The Latter is guaranteed from the fact that g is positive at q = q * . Therefore, the maximum value of g must be positive too.
D Model without Scale Effect
We introduce population growth, γ, in this model. Then population at time t, L(t) is given by L 0 · e −γt . Discounted lifetime utility of a representative individual in a household can be written as W = ∞ t e −(ρ−γ)(τ −t) log(U (τ ))dτ , where the static utility has the same functional form as in section 2 in Gangopadhyay and Mondal (2012) . The intertemporal budget constraint isȦ (t) = w(t) + r(t)A(t) − γA(t) − e(t). Here, e(t) denotes the instantaneous expenditure of the representative consumer. We need to assume that ρ > γ. Consumer's optimization exercise gives the standard Euler's equationė (t) e(t) = r(t) − ρ; and normalizing the expenditure to unity, we obtain r(t) = ρ. We use the knowledge spillover term in the R&D sector as 1
where 0 < φ < 1. As in the model in the text, the instantaneous profit of a monopoly firm is given by π M . But equation (5) is now modified to be C = a (n M +λn C ) φ w. Since free entry condition with ongoing R&D implies that C = v, we must havev v = −φg in the steady state. With this, equation (6) (n M +λn C ) φ w = ρ + φqg; and with some reformulation, we arrive at the following form:
From the labour market equilibrium condition, we get the following expression of n M x M :
Using equations (A-6) and (A-7) and rearranging further one gets the following relationship:
We must have g = γ 1−φ to ensure that the sectoral allocation of labour remain constant along the balanced growth path. This uniquely solves for the rate of innovation. Then, we plug in the value of g in equation (A-8) to have an expression for L n 1−φ . We define a new variable δ such that δ = L n 1−φ . One interpretation of δ is that it is an inverse measure of the 'R&D difficulty index'. In the steady state, δ is constant. Equation (A-8) can now be written as
(A-9)
From equation (A-9), if an increase in q increases δ then the rate of innovation has to decline temporarily. To show that this possibility can arise, define a new variable Z(q) such that Z(q) ≡
≥ 0 is a sufficient condition for dδ dq > 0. The latter holds true if q is sufficiently large and some other regularity conditions are satisfied. The proof goes as follows:
Proof: To prove that Z (.) > 0 (or,
But the left hand side of this last inequality is a decreasing function of q if λ ≥ α −ε . This curve is asymptotic to the vertical axis when q approaches zero and reaches to the value unity at q = 1. The right hand side of this inequality is a constant with value greater than unity if λ > 1 + φ , we get the desired result that an increase in the strength of IPR protection may temporarily decrease the rate of innovation and permanently increase δ.
